The severe earthquake in Japan and the resulting tsunami has brought about the next emergency: the nuclear power plant in Fukushima Daiichi has come under severe pressure and a nuclear meltdown is a realistic scenario for at least two of a total of six reactors.
Fukushima Daiichi is not the only power plant to be affected by the earthquake. According to Greenpeace, also facing trouble are Fukushima Daini (4 reactors), Onagawa (3 reactors) and Tokai (1 reactor).
The scientific and technological particulars are difficult to understand. For the most solid explanation I have come across in plain English I recommend Rachel Maddow’s 13-minute video at MSNBC (click here).
Over the next days, discussions are bound to erupt as to the use and risks of nuclear energy and what this implies for energy policy. Questions will be raised as to whether this could have been prevented and, if so, how. Citizens around the world and, especially, the Japanese will want to know whether their government has acted responsibly and in a transparent way. How hopeless and helpless must we be when faced with a natural catastrophe?
Risk is one of those uncomfortable notions that have to do with probability. Following probability theory, all events are possible, including the worst- and the best-case scenarios. What varies is the likelihood of occurrence. Natural disasters like earthquakes of the order of 9 points on the Richter magnitude scale are risks of low probability but with potentially devastating impacts.
Policy has, of course, to consider such risks as well, whereby their low probability will often remove them from the immediate centre of attention. There are two reasons for this: first, there are many other risks with higher incidence rates, therefore prioritization is necessary; second, the technologies needed to mitigate the effects of high-impact risks such as natural disasters are very costly. Is that too cynical of an argument? Under normal circumstances most people will think not. Faced with the pictures of the Japanese disaster, they are likely to say yes, and demand redress.
However, before we rush to classify the Japanese incident as one of those inevitable and unpredictable events, some questions need to be answered. The following list is not exhaustive. You are cordially invited to add your own. (fn1)
• Was the Fukushima nuclear power plant designed and/or upgraded according to the latest safety standards—in general and, more specifically with regard its cooling systems and containers?
• Is it true that the majority of Japanese nuclear plants are not designed to cope with earthquakes above 8 points on the Richter scale?
• Were the recommendations of the IAEA of 2003 regarding the “Seismic Design and Qualification of Nuclear Power Plants” taken into account? How?
• Why does the IAEA not use more quantitative indicators and thresholds (but rather prefers to talk about ‘adequate’ technologies and the like)?
• How were the various safety incidents faced by Japanese power plants since the 1990s been reflected in Japanese energy policy?
Depending on the answers to the above questions, we can then decide as to whether this was an incident which could not have been avoided; or whether it could have been avoided had the safety standards been adhered to. Accordingly, we may then begin to tackle the questions about the fundamentals of nuclear power energy (yes vs. no), or its particulars (the ‘how’).
fn1: On the role of scientific expertise in risk assessment and regulation, consult also the European Journal of Risk Regulation and Alberto Alemanno’s blog
Thanks. Summarising the issue of us ordinary people very nicely. However, besides a Yes/No to nuclear power – another influential factor is what other sources of power are available to places like Japan and at what cost? For example: South Africa is in the process of developing plans (already approved) for a second nuclear power plant. Thus far electricity has been generated from coal-based power stations with significantly negative consequences for the environment. So for me the answer to the worldwide Power conundrum is definitely in the HOW.
Whilst the state of their nuclear power plants obviously gives cause for concern, we should not let it overshadow the far greater concern we should have for the plight of the Japanese people.
The design of the PWR (Pressurised Water Reactor) is such that even if there were a partial meltdown, large-scale release of dangerously radioactive materials such as I-131 is very unlikely. Think Three-mile Island (1979), also a PWR, rather than Chernobyl (1986) or Windscale UK (1957). In both these latter incidents the core was exposed and caught fire, thus releasing large amount of fission products (such as I-131) an event that is very unlikely with the PWR.
Remember there is no perfectly safe way of generating power. Think of all those coal miners killed over the years or the 162 oil workers who died on Piper Alpha in 1988. I’d wager more people have died falling off windmills than have been killed in the nuclear industry.
As much as it pains me to reason with casualties in terms of cold fact numbers, one needs to be a little distant in analyzing these accidents.
Thus far, no one has died or fallen ill as a result of this nuclear incident, and we are talking about the most extreme case of “everything that could go wrong”. We are talking about an event in which people died because they were under a roof, because they were close (say, 1 km close) to the shore or simply because they were driving. Now, no one would say that Japanese should live in tents, stay 5 km away from the shore at all times and never drive a car, to prevent casualties in case of an earthquake. A small but significant risk exists in each of those activities and one has to accept that risk in order to operate as a a society. Unless this regrettable accident turns into a major nuclear catastrophe with a number of casualties similar to the earthquake itself, I really don’t think we should rethink a complete energy policy based upon the consequences of the most extreme natural accident Japan has ever faced.